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Abstract—CRAC is an IT-architecture-based method for as-
sessing and comparing confidentiality risks of distributed IT
systems. The method determines confidentiality risks by taking
into account the effects of the leakage of confidential information
(e.g. industrial secrets), and the paths that may be followed by
different attackers (e.g. insider and outsider). We evaluate its
effectiveness by applying it to a real-world outsourcing case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, most data exchange within and across bound-
aries of organizations takes place electronically. Exchanged
data often contains confidential information, the loss of which
could result in economic damage. (We call “confidential
data” exactly the data that by business policy should not be
disclosed to unauthorized users, e.g. business information and
patient data) Good security, on the other hand, is also costly
and even the most expensive countermeasures cannot prevent
all possible confidentiality incidents. Therefore, one of the
goals of security officers is to realize and maintain an IT
system which strikes the right balance among security, budget,
and system usability. To achieve this, they typically refer
to well-established standards and best practices such as ISO
27002 [6] and NIST 800-30 [1]. Assessing IT (confidentiality)
risks becomes particularly challenging in the presence of
cross-organizational cooperations, e.g. IT outsourcing. As part
of the cooperation, organizations typically connect their IT-
architectures together and they grant access rights to each
other’s (confidential) information. This network of organi-
zations increases the complexity of the confidentiality risk
assessment because one has to deal with a more complex IT-
architecture and with an extended set of potential threats.
One of the crucial factors influencing the confidentiality
risks a company faces is the IT architecture the company
(and its outsourcers) employs to store its confidential data.
This is intuitively obvious: an encrypted database behind
firewalls accessible only via VPN (virtual private network)
is less vulnerable than a similar unencrypted database without
firewalls protecting it. In general, how and where confidential
data is stored has a large impact on its overall security. In
spite of the obviousness of this statement, mainstream risk
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assessment methodologies take into little consideration the IT
architecture where confidential data is stored.
Therefore, to make informed decisions on the (security)
design of its IT-architecture, decision makers need to be able
to assess and compare different IT-architectures also according
to the confidentiality risks. This can only be achieved if
risks are assessed consistently for each considered solution.
However, the result of typical risk analysis methods cannot
be consistently compared with each other if they were carried
out by different people. This happens because they are mostly
based either on the subjective opinion of the different risk
assessor(s) or on event histories. Confidentiality risks are even
harder to assess in an inter-subjective (independent of personal
judgment) way, because of their non-functional nature and the
(typical) lack of logs about past incidents.
To address these problems, we present the Confidentiality
Risk Assessment and Comparison (CRAC) method. With the
CRAC-method one can assess confidentiality risks by taking
into account both how information assets flow in the underly-
ing IT-architecture and the different paths attackers can use to
find their way in the architecture. We use information flow [11]
to analyze where and “how much” critical information is
located in the various parts of the the system, and a customized
version of attack paths [12] to analyze how attackers with
different profiles might reach this information.
CRAC is meant to support IT-enabled network of organiza-
tions, in reducing the subjectivity of the (confidentiality) risk
assessment results. CRAC improves and extends our earlier
work, DCRA [9], for confidentiality risk assessments.
The underlying idea of the CRAC-method is that of linking
the likelihood of loss of confidentiality of a given data asset
with its “reachability” within the IT-architecture. This is at the
same time the strength and the limitation of the method: on
one hand it allows to reference the IT-architecture as a crucial
element for assessing confidentiality risks; on the other hand
it does not consider factors and risks such as insider trading.
This is a design choice: CRAC can be easily integrated with
other risk assessment methods and can be used as a specialized
“plug in” when they need to assess the intrinsic confidentiality
risks of an IT-architecture.
II. THE CRAC-METHOD
The CRAC-method extends the IT security related aspects
of ISO/IEC 27001 [5], by trying to assess how difficult it is
for unauthorized users to access confidential information. The
CRAC-method is based on two ideas. (1) Information is a
logical asset, so it can flow from one component to the other
one, e.g. it could flow to a component because a user copies
it there. (2) An attacker may penetrate into a system through
different components and follow different attack paths. CRAC
analysis consists of four steps, which we now illustrate (see
[10] for a more detailed description of each step and how each
step is executed in two real world case studies).
a) Step 0: Collecting Basic Information: In this step
we collect: (1) the list of information assets present on the
system, their confidentiality level and homogeneity property;
(2) the list of components that form the IT-architecture of
the system in scope and of the links among them; (3) the
list of relevant vulnerabilities; and (4) the list of possible
threat agents. We adopt the following notation: L is the set
of confidentiality levels; N is the set of information asset
quantity classes; I is the set of single impact values; TI
is the set of total impact values; P is the set of qualitative
likelihood values. We call information assets the “semantic
components of an information system that are required for an
organization to conduct its mission or business” [7]. A is the
set of information assets we consider. To each information
asset a ∈ A we associate a confidentiality level l(a). C is
the set of components (i.e. hardware, software or network
segment) which may contain one or more instances of a
given information asset a. The mapping n : A × C → N
is a qualitative estimate of the number of instances of a that
can be retrieved from component c at once. An information
asset a is homogeneous if the damage due to its disclosure
can be considered proportional to the number of its instances
that get disclosed. For example “social security numbers” are
homogeneous, since the damage due to the loss of one hundred
social security numbers is larger than the damage due to
the loss of a single social security number. Conversely, an
information asset is non-homogeneous if the damage due to
the disclosure of one instance is as big as the damage of the
disclosure of all instances. For example, if the login credentials
of one user get disclosed, the damage to the company is
basically the same as if the credentials of 100 users with
equal access rights would be disclosed. We model this with
the mapping h : A→ {homogeneous, non−homogeneous}.
b) Step 1: Analyzing Information Flow: We now ana-
lyze the logical and physical connections among components
(in other words, we analyze the IT-architecture). Then, we
determine the impact of each component by considering the
information assets that may flow to it. If there is a possibility
for an information asset to flow to a component then we
proceed as if that information asset was actually present on
that component. To model information flow we build for each
information asset a a set of flow paths. A flow path is a path
in the architecture graph which starts with a component where
a is stored.
Definition II.1. (architecture graph) An architecture graph
arch = 〈C,E〉 is a directed graph in which C is a set of
vertices representing components and E is a set of edges
E ⊆ C × C. (c1, c2) ∈ E if and only if there exists a direct
connection between c1 and c2 such that information can flow
from c1 to c2 or an attacker who has access to c1 can disclose
the information available on c2.
The nodes of a flow path represent the components in which
a can be accessed by an attacker. We represent a flow path by
an ordered list (with no repetitions) fp = [c1, . . . , cn] where
c1 . . . cn ∈ C. We call FPa = {fp1, . . . , fpm} the set of
flow paths of a. We use (if desired) the maximum number of
instances that may flow to a component c from its connected
components to determine the number of instances an attacker
can disclose by gaining access to c.
After constructing the flow paths we determine for each
information asset a, for each component c and for each flow
path fp ∈ FPa, the number of instances of a that are present in
c according to fp using the function (n : A×C×FPa → N ). If
we call index(c, fp) the index of c inside fp, then n(a, c, fp) =
mini≤index(c)n(a, ci), where ci ∈ fp.
Summarizing, fp allows us to determine how many instances
of a are present on c. Now, we can determine for each a, c and
fp, the impact of the disclosure of the instances of a which
are present in c. The function fp uses the function (fp-imp :
A×C × FPa → I), which considers the number of instances
of an information asset which can be extracted to a component
at once, its confidentiality level and homogeneity.
fp-imp(a, c, fp) =
l(a) n(a, c, fp) , if h(a) = homogeneous;l(a) all , if n(a, c, fp) 6= none;
null , else.
Here  : L × N → I is a monotonic composition operator
for the values in L and N .  should be agreed on with
the risk assessment stakeholders. As we discussed before,
quantitative values for the impact are difficult to obtain in
practice. However, if quantitative values are available, then
the  operator behaves as a multiplication. Now, we are able
to compute the impact of the disclosure the information asset
a via component c, imp : A× C → I , as
imp(c, a) = maxfp∈FPa fp-imp(a, c, fp)
Summarizing, in this step we have built a set of information
flow paths: one for each architecture graph, information asset,
component the assets resides on and graph path. Then, we
determined the impact of the leakage of the information asset
stored on each component in the architecture.
We call total impact for component c the impact of the
disclosure of all confidential information assets available on
c. If c contains only one information asset a, then imp(c) =
imp(c, a). On the other hand, if c contains two or more assets
(say a1 and a2) then we “add” imp(c, a1) and imp(c, a2). To
this end we use the monotone operator ⊕ : TI × I → TI .
As for , ⊕ shall be agreed on with the stakeholders. More
formally, the total impact of c is:
imp(c) = ⊕a∈Aimp(c, a)
c) Step 2: Attack Propagation Paths: In the second
step of the CRAC-method we build the Attack Propagation
Paths (APPs) which describe how different threat agents may
penetrate into the IT-architecture. Then, we determine the
likelihood that a threat agent gets unauthorized access to the
information available on each component. We call T the set
of threat agents.
We call vulnerabilities weaknesses of the components which
make attack propagation possible. We call V the set of all the
vulnerabilities. We represent the fact that v is a weakness of c
with a mapping w : V ×C → {true, false}, and the likelihood
that a threat agent t exploits a vulnerability v to compromise
a component c with the mapping p : T × V × C → P .
To model confidentiality breaches we build for each threat
agent t a set of APPs. The nodes of an APP represent the
components that an attacker can compromise during an attack.
We build each APP in two steps. We first add a node (c1)
to the APP for each component that can be directly reached
by a threat agent (for external threat agents we can add
a special component “the internet”). Second, we iteratively
add new nodes and edges as follows: if node c1 is in the
architecture graph and is connected to the component c2, then
we add c2 to the APP. Similarly to information flow paths,
we represent an APP by an ordered list app = [c1, . . . , cn]
where c1 . . . cn ∈ C with no repeated occurrences of ci. We
call APPt = {app1, . . . , appn} the set of APPs a threat agent
t can follow.
We can now make an estimate of the likelihood that a threat
agent t compromises each component c by following an attack
propagation path in APPt. In doing so we need to consider
two properties: (1) each component may have more than one
vulnerability that t can exploit, in this case we assume the
threat agent will exploit the vulnerability with the highest
associated likelihood; and (2) if the threat agent needs to
compromise other components in order to compromise c, then
we assume that the likelihood of compromising c is the lowest
likelihood of the list (i.e. the hardest step). Given a component
c, a threat agent t, a set of vulnerabilities V , an attack path
app ∈ APPt, and index(c, app) the index of c in the ordered
list app, we call p : T × C × APPt → P the likelihood of t
compromising c by following app where
p(t, c, app) = mini<index(c,app)maxv∈{v|v∈V,w(v,c)=true}p(t, v, ci)
Finally, by merging the likelihood of exploiting a compo-
nent w.r.t the alternative APPs, we determine the component’s
reachability level.
Definition II.2. (Reachability) Given a component c, the
reachability level of c reach : C → P equals to the likelihood
of the APP that leads to c and is the easiest (i.e. highest
likelihood) among alternative APPs that may be followed by
a threat agents t. Accordingly,
reach(c) = maxt∈T (maxapp∈APPt(p(t, c, app)))
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS.
Measures CRAC Check-list CRAMM
M1: # of aspects 18 16 25
M2: % of optional aspects 16% 44% 4%
M3: % of adjustable aspects 44% 25% 36%
M4: % of non-subjective aspects 78% 63% 72%
d) Step 3: Risk Calculation and Comparison: In this step
we combine the output of steps 1 and 2 to identify the weak
spots in the system and eventually compare the security of
alternative IT-architectures. We identify the weak spots based
on their confidentiality risk.
Definition II.3. (Risk) Given a component c with total impact
imp(c) and reachability level reach(c), we call the risk of c
the pair risk(c) = 〈imp(c), reach(c)〉.
After determining the risk of all components of each IT-
architecture we sort them. We identify the most critical com-
ponents as those components with the highest total impact
and reachability level. Then we determine which architecture
is more robust w.r.t. confidentiality risk by comparing the risk
of assets on the different architectures.
III. EVALUATION
According to the stakeholders a successful confidentiality
risk method should satisfy the following criteria: (C1) the
method should allow the risk assessor to represent the com-
plexity of the system to be assessed in a detailed manner
and is justified by the goal of the case-study stakeholders;
(C2) the method should be practical to implement; and (C3)
the method should deliver less subjective results. We measure
how well our solution scores w.r.t. these criteria based on the
following measures: (M1) the number of risk-related aspects
the method is able to represent (e.g. attack propagation);
(M2) the percentage of optional risk-related aspects; (M3)
the percentage of aspect that can be analyzed with more
detail if the system is confidentiality sensitive; and (M4) the
percentage of non-subjective aspects. We measure (C1) with
(M1) and (M3) and (C2) with (M2) and (M3). The goal of the
stakeholders are to compare the confidentiality risks of two
alternative IT-architectures. This requires assessing the risks
of these two IT-architectures separately and then comparing
the assessment results. Different risk assessors must be able
to work on the two assessments. Therefore, the method they
use must be inter-subjective (C3). Since the subjectivity of
assessment depends on the subjectivity of the aspects that are
used for determining the incident likelihood and impact, we
measure it by the percentage of non-subjective aspects (M4).
We now compare CRAC with two risk assessment methods
w.r.t. the success criteria above. The methods we consider are:
a checklist based RA-method used by the auditors and the
(well-known) CRAMM-method [2]. Table I reports a summary
of this comparison. Regarding M1, using the CRAMM-method
one is able to take into account almost twice as many aspects
than with the check-list based approach and our CRAC-
method. Some of the aspects that the CRAMM-method takes
into account (and CRAC does not) are the number of persons
using the assets, threat level and potential impact scenarios.
However, there are also aspects that CRAC considers and
CRAMM does not. They are information homogeneity and
volume. Regarding M2, the RA-method allows one to ignore
30% more aspects than the CRAC-method and 40% more
aspects than the CRAMM-method. Regarding M3, the CRAC-
method considers 19% more aspects than the check-list based
approach and 8% more aspects than the CRAMM-method with
adjustable granularity. For instance, if the assessor wants to
have a more detailed risk assessment then the CRAC-method
allows the assessor to consider the number of instances of an
information asset on a given component. Consequently, with
the CRAC-method the risk assessor can adjust the granularity
of the impact determination depending on the desired detail
level of a risk assessed. Regarding M4, CRAC uses the highest
percentage of non-subjective aspects. It is followed by the
CRAMM-method, which uses only 6% less non-subjective
aspects than CRAC. This happens because most of the infor-
mation CRAC uses is either generally well-documented or pre-
viously agreed on by all stakeholders. Although, the CRAC-
method considers almost the same number of aspects as the
RA-method, the RA method has 15% more subjective aspects
than CRAC that can be adjusted to the desired granularity
at which the risk assessment is carried out. Accordingly, we
argue that both the CRAC-method and the CRAMM-method
represent confidentiality risks better than the RA-method.
Repeatability of CRAC depends on satisfying two assump-
tions: (A1) IT-architectural drawings on the system to be risk
assessed are available; and (A2) for risk assessment purposes
staff with good security understanding can be interviewed.
Providers of outsourcing services usually have to deliver a
high level IT-architectural document describing the system
to be outsourced. Therefore, if applied to a case where the
outsourcing provider and client are big organizations then both
assumptions are fulfilled.
We interviewed our industrial partners after applying CRAC
to their system. We believe that one of the reasons why we
achieved good results is that the CRAC-method is specifi-
cally designed for assessing “confidentiality” risks, whereas
the other methods aim to assess confidentiality, integrity,
and availability risks at once. Furthermore, we developed
the CRAC-method with the success criteria defined by the
stakeholders in our minds, whereas CRAMM is not developed
to serve the goals of the stakeholders in this case.
IV. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
In [9] we introduced the DCRA-model. CRAC improves and
extends DCRA for outsourced IT-systems. In these scenarios
detailed information on confidentiality aspects, e.g. volume
of information stored on each component, is not explicitly
available. Therefore, CRAC presents a more practical approach
that systematically elicits information. Here we consider the
volume of information flowing and information flow paths.
Furthermore, the DCRA-method does not consider attacker
profiles and to whom the information gets disclosed. These
concepts become especially critical at cross-organizational
cooperations. CRAC addresses these concepts by extending
the DCRA-method with the concept of threat agents for attack
path identification.
For confidentiality it is essential to model how information
flows. In the literature we find a number of approaches for
modeling security with information flow graphs, e.g. [3], [11],
[8]. However, only Chivers [3] uses information flow trees
and form attack paths for analyzing risk. The diagrams they
propose however cannot be used for comparing risks of two
IT-architectures.
Attack paths and attack trees are introduced by
Schneier [12] and are widely used in the security literature
(e.g. [4]) to model different ways of compromising a system.
In most cases, the nodes of an attack graph represent threats
or vulnerabilities, as threat trees do. Our approach resembles
attack threes because we model how an attack propagates.
However, we carry out the propagation analysis at the
IT-architecture level.
In this paper we presented the CRAC-method and how
it can be used (1) as supplement to the existing risk man-
agement approaches for practically assessing confidentiality
risks of an IT-system in presence of outsourcing, and (2) as a
stand alone tool for comparing the security of IT-architectures
w.r.t. confidentiality. The CRAC-method extends the concept
of architecture-based confidentiality risk assessment in the
absence of explicit information by (a) eliciting impact related
information for modeling the information flow and (b) eliciting
the reachability information of critical information assets by
modeling “attack paths”.
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